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•	 North	Korea’s	nuclear	and	missile	
programmes	will	likely	continue	in	
the	short	term.
•	 Sanctions	will	only	be	effective	if	
China	agrees	to	robustly	implement	
them.
•	 North	Korea	is	once	again	a	divisive	
issue	between	the	US	and	China.
•	 North	Korea’s	actions	is	driving	
closer	security	cooperation	between	
the	US,	Japan	and	South	Korea.
 In the first eight months of 2016, North 
Korea has repeatedly defied the will of the 
international community. In a sign of their 
intransigence, on 5 September North Korea 
tested 3 ballistic missiles as world leaders 
met at the G20 summit in China.  4 days 
later, a fifth nuclear test was performed. By 
testing nuclear weapons and undertaking an 
unprecedented series of missile launches, 
Pyongyang has created a new normal where 
their belligerent actions on the Korean 
Peninsula are seemingly unaffected by the 
international reaction. 
While the international community 
has been unified in its condemnation, a 
geopolitical split has emerged as to the 
correct approach to resolving the issue. 
Attitudes in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo 
have hardened, and while China has agreed 
to new sanctions there is far from unanimity 
in Northeast Asia. In many respects, 
North Korea’s actions have highlighted an 
increasing split between China, the US and 
its allies. The likelihood of a resolution 
to this long-running problem seems 
increasingly remote.
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WHAT HAS OCCURRED?
North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in early 
January signalled the start of a new round of 
heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. 
One month later, Pyongyang once again 
drew the ire of the international community 
by launching a primitive satellite in to 
space using rocket technology prohibited 
by United Nation sanctions. Neither action 
seemed to represent a substantial advance 
in weapons technology but indicated that 
North Korea’s WMD and missile programmes 
were continuing despite all international 
efforts to bring them to a halt. Early 
indications following the fifth nuclear test on 
9 September suggest a weapon with a larger 
yield. This highlights the progress the North’s 
nuclear program has seen since Kim Jong-un 
took power.
North Korea has continued to develop and 
test missile technology. It is in the process of 
developing a submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM), and has performed 19 
ballistic missile test-launches since January 
2016. These launches serve both a political 
and developmental function. They are a tool 
to signal North Korean displeasure with 
the actions of the US, South Korea or other 
members of the international community. 
They are also used to improve and test 
missile designs with longer range and 
heavier payload capacity. As an example, 
the Musudan IRBM, which with a range of 
approximately 4,000km could hit targets in 
Japan and Guam, has been tested six times 
this year with five failures and one apparent 
partial success. 
WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
If and when Pyongyang is successful in 
marrying its missile technology with its 
nuclear programme, the Kim regime will 
have substantially increased its political 
leverage.
North Korea currently poses a substantial 
conventional threat to South Korea, and 
in particular the Seoul Metropolitan Area. 
While it is unlikely that North Korea would 
be victorious in a conflict, it does have the 
capacity to inflict significant damage. A North 
Korean nuclear weapon would radically 
increase this ability, but as South Korea is 
covered by the US nuclear umbrella any use 
of such technology by Pyongyang would 
ultimately result in its destruction. The same 
deterrent logic applies as North Korea gains 
the ability to target Japan, US facilities in 
Guam or even the US mainland. 
A deployable North Korean nuclear 
weapon does however alter the strategic 
calculus. Given the massive potential for 
destruction, such a capability must always 
be considered. It raises the stakes in any 
crisis, makes negotiations more difficult 
and reduces the US and its allies’ strategic 
leverage over North Korea. 
In short, for the Kim regime, a nuclear 
weapon provides a degree of insurance 
against the influence of external powers and 
there are few incentives for Pyongyang to 
forgo such a useful tool. 
SANCTIONS
The continued tests have highlighted the 
lack of available options for the international 
community. Unable or unwilling to alter 
North Korean behaviour by force, the 
primary international response has been to 
impose further sanctions in the hope that 
increased economic pressure and resource 
scarcity will invoke a change in behaviour. 
The US, South Korea and Japan have 
implemented unilateral yet coordinated 
measures. Washington has strengthened 
its sanctions regime. The US now has the 
legal capability to freeze the assets of any 
North Korean involved in the development 
of nuclear or missile technology, has frozen 
North Korean government assets in the 
US, has banned trade with North Korea 
and can blacklist anybody found to be in 
contravention of existing sanctions. In 
June 2016, the US imposed fresh sanctions 
aimed at banks or companies which conduct 
business with North Korea, in an effort to 
further isolate its access to the international 
financial system. A month later, in an effort 
to apply more pressure, President Obama 
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imposed specific sanctions on Kim Jong-
un and 14 other North Korean officials for 
repeated human rights abuses. At the same 
time, Japan has greatly restricted trade and 
interactions with North Korea, including the 
banning of all North Korean flagged vessels 
from entering Japanese ports.
Although these restrictions are 
substantial, China is the most important 
actor in ensuring the efficacy of any 
international sanctions regime. As North 
Korea’s largest trading partner, only ally 
and geographic neighbour, China has the 
capacity to greatly influence North Korea’s 
economy. Despite China’s disapproval of 
North Korea’s nuclear programme, Beijing 
has traditionally been hesitant in applying 
tough sanctions. This reticence stems from a 
fear of strategic instability should the North 
Korean regime collapse. It is also apparent 
that a reduced economic relationship with 
North Korea could limit Beijing’s (probably 
overestimated) political leverage.
Following considerable US and South 
Korean diplomatic engagement, China 
allowed tough new sanctions to be passed 
by the UN Security Council on 2 March. 
However, Beijing has been critical of the 
further unilateral measures imposed by 
Washington. For sanctions to be effective, 
implementation must be enforced. However, 
suspicions remain about how rigorous China 
will be in ensuring that the sanctions regime 
will be obeyed.
SOUTH KOREA AND A HARDENING OF 
ATTITUDES
South Korea’s response is worthy of special 
attention due to the implications for inter-
Korean relations. Since the January tests 
and the continued missile launches there 
has been a noticeable hardening of attitudes 
in Seoul towards North Korea. Seoul has 
bolstered its own sanctions regime, targeting 
specific individuals and companies which 
support North Korea’s nuclear programme. 
It has also banned any vessel, which has 
stopped in the preceding 180 days in North 
Korea, from entering South Korean waters.
On February 10, South Korea announced 
the closure of the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC). This was a joint venture and 
a centrepiece of the Sunshine Policy pursued 
by South Korea in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. South Korean companies developed 
manufacturing facilities on the northern side 
of the Demilitarised Zone to be operated 
by North Korean workers. Previously, the 
complex has been used as a political football, 
most notably in 2013, when it was closed for 
five months during heightened tensions on 
the peninsula. 
What is different in this current round 
of tension is that Seoul, not Pyongyang, has 
ordered the closure of the complex, recalling 
staff and cutting off power and water to 
the site. The logic behind such an action, as 
explained by the South Korean government, 
is that a large percentage of money paid to 
Pyongyang has been siphoned off to support 
its missile and nuclear programme. 
Following the closure of the KIC, North 
Korea’s military took over the facility. It 
also cut the military hotline between the 
two warring states, a not unexpected yet 
worrying development given its utility in 
dealing with crises on the peninsula. Given 
Seoul’s assertions as to the use of funds and 
the probable difficulty of persuading South 
Korean businesses to return to Kaesong, 
the ability of this one concrete symbol of 
inter-Korean cooperation to survive the 
current crisis seems to be in doubt. There is 
little prospect of any political or economic 
engagement between the two sides given the 
current impasse. 
There has also been a noticeable increase 
in calls within South Korea for an indigenous 
nuclear weapons programme of their own. 
The US under Obama or a future Clinton 
administration would most likely prevent 
such a development; however, political 
uncertainty from Washington or continued 
North Korean provocations will only 
strengthen this growing movement in Seoul. 
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CHINA AND A NEW SOURCE OF 
TENSION
Despite China agreeing to stronger UN 
sanctions, North Korea’s actions have further 
exposed a rift between China and the US 
and its allies over how to denuclearise 
the peninsula. China has been promoting 
talks either through the existing six-party 
dialogue framework or through other 
forums. The US, South Korea and Japan will 
not support such a move without a prior 
commitment from North Korea to halt or 
even discuss their nuclear programme. This 
precondition represents a significant barrier 
to the resumption of talks and will likely 
remain under the current administrations in 
Washington and Seoul. 
A further implication of these tests is 
the future deployment of the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile 
defence system on South Korean soil. The US 
has wanted to station this system in South 
Korea for a number of years but Seoul had 
refused primarily due to pressure from 
Beijing. It has been agreed that THAAD will 
deployed by the end of 2017 in an area out 
of range of North Korean artillery. It will 
be used to protect US and South Korean 
facilities in the south of the country
While there is some dispute as to the 
added level of protection THAAD will provide 
given South Korea’s proximity to the North 
and the multitude of threats it faces, its radar 
will nevertheless provide much improved 
coverage over North Korea. It could also 
allow South Korea to contribute to or be 
included in a tri-lateral missile defence 
arrangement with Japan and the US in the 
future. Currently, there are mixed messages 
coming out of Seoul regarding this possibility, 
demonstrating the level of political 
sensitivity the issue has in South Korea.
The agreement over THAAD has seen the 
deterioration of relations between South 
Korea and China. The relationship between 
the two countries had been increasingly 
close, largely thanks to the efforts of the 
President Park in engaging with Xi, Jinping. 
This occasionally raised eyebrows in the US 
regarding the future strategic positioning of 
South Korea. The North’s actions alongside 
China’s apparent reticence to sanction its 
ally has forced South Korea’s hand and Seoul 
is now going all in with Washington in their 
approach to the problem of North Korea; 
THAAD is symbolic of this change. China 
has voiced substantial displeasure over 
the deployment of THAAD and there are 
indications that Beijing may retaliate with 
economic measures or even revert to a more 
positive attitude towards North Korea.
TRILATERAL COOPERATION
The opposite has occurred in Seoul’s 
relationship with Tokyo. In the last few 
months there has been a heightened and 
more public level of coordination between 
both the political and military leaderships 
in both countries. The Park government has 
decided to move past the historical issues 
that have plagued relations. This is most 
evident in the controversial agreement with 
the Abe government over the issue of the 
Comfort Women. Information sharing has 
been improved with the US acting as hub 
through which Japan and South Korea can 
transfer intelligence and momentum seems 
to exist to further develop and formalise 
relations. This has now been operationalised 
with the South Korean Navy undertaking 
joint exercises aimed at countering North 
Korea’s missile threat with their Japanese 
and US counterparts.
Such cooperation makes the strategic 
picture much clearer for the United 
States, which in March demonstrated its 
commitment to its South Korean ally by 
taking part in the largest ever series of South 
Korea – US military exercises. 
However, the three countries’ individual 
influence over Pyongyang has traditionally 
been weak and there is little reason to 
believe that combined this would change. On 
an operational level, despite improvements, 
South Korea and Japan remain far apart. 
Additionally, previous attempts to develop 
the relationship – most notably following 
the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010 – fell 
apart as historical, diplomatic and economic 
concerns once again came to the fore in 
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Seoul. For China, however, this improvement 
in trilateral cooperation, no matter how 
limited, bolsters their fear of US containment. 
How counterproductive the effect of this fear 
will be, vis-à-vis North Korea and China’s 
commitment to sanctions, remains to be seen. 
WHAT NEXT?
At North Korea’s 7th Party Congress held 
in May 2016 Kim, Jong-un indicated that 
the nuclear and missile programmes would 
continue. This despite the increasing 
harshness of the sanctions regime and the 
coordinated response of the international 
community. 
It is this reality that the world needs to 
accept. Short of a collapse scenario, there 
is little indication that the current impasse 
can be resolved. While the upcoming 
election in the US may provide political 
cover to change approach, this is unlikely 
given North Korea’s continued belligerence 
and the political climate in both countries. 
Prolonged instability punctuated by periods 
of heightened tension will most likely remain 
the norm on the Korean Peninsula and the 
surrounding region for the foreseeable 
future. 
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